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EDITORIAL NOTES
The decision in this case has been deservedly regarded as one
of far reaching import. Some critics have been concerned about
its potentialities in disrupting the merit system, but it is doubt-
ful if such fears are justified. As pointed out by the Chief
Justice, the merit system operates in the realm of those inferior
officers appointed by heads of departments and should thus not be
affected. If the time should come when Congress thinks it
desirable to extend it to some of the inferior officers now excluded
-such as collectors of internal revenue, postmasters, and others-
they could readily be removed from possible danger, by legal
transferrence of the power to appoint from the President and
Senate to the heads of departments. In other directions, how-
ever, the results of the decision are likely to be felt. In estab-
lishing the numerous boards and commissions that populate the
city of Washington today Congress has uninformly adhered to
the policy of making them continuous bodies with longer tenures
than that of the President, and with the avowed purpose of
enabling them to perform their functions, sometimes quasi-
judicial in nature, independently of control from the Presidential
office. Among such boards may be mentioned the Interstate
Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the
Federal Reserve Board, the Shipping Board, and many others.
The same may be said of the Comptroller General. Under the
act of 1921, he is subject to removal only by impeachment or
joint resolution of Congress, but it is difficult to see how these
restrictions could protect him should the President desire to
oust him. Since all these officers are appointed by the President
and Senate, they fall within the general line of reasoning pursued
in the majority opinion and would thus be subject to removal
exclusively by the President without restrictions imposed by
Congress. Presidential control over this type of executive
officer can be greatly enhanced by the doctrine of this case.
C. 0. GARDNER.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - INSURANCE - WHEN FOREIGN INSUR-
ANCE COMPANY DOING BUSINESS WITHIN STAT,
The extent of the power of a state over foreign (.orpor:tions
engaged in business within its borders has been a fruitful source
of litigation both in federal and state courts. That 1ti'sl ion was
involved in an interestingway in the recent case of I.iitjntclto Fire
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Ins. Co. v. Conn, 47 Sup. Ct. 88 (U. S. 1926), affirming 9 Fed.
(2d) 202 (1925).
The Palmetto Fire Ins. Co., a South Carolina corporation,
licensed to do business in Ohio, made in Michigan a so-called
open contract of insurance with the Chrysler Sales Corporation,
a Michigan corporation organized to distribute the Chrysler
automobile, whereby the Palmetto Co. agreed to issue certificates
of insurance to purchasers of Chrysler cars wherever sold. The
contract provided that the Chrysler Co. should collect from its
dealers in the various states, whenever cars should be delivered
to them, the amount of the premiums for such insurance, and the
dealers in turn should collect a like amount from purchasers of
cars as a part of the purchase price. It further provided that the
Chrysler Co. should make a monthly report of sales and remit-
tance of premiums so collected to the Insurance Co. which would
issue certificates direct to the purchasers. The Chrysler dealers
in Ohio were not authorized to act as agents of the Palmetto Co.
in the manner provided by the Ohio statutes. The defendant
Conn, State Insurance Commissioner of Ohio, insisted that the
above plan was in violation of the provisions of Gen. Code Ohio,
section 5438, prohibiting the insurance of property in the state,
except by legally authorized agents, and section 5433, which
taxes business lawfully done there, and for that reason cancelled
the license of the Palmetto Co. That Company thereupon
brought suit in the federal district court for an injunction, which
was denied. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, held that this open con-
tract plan was in violation of the Ohio statutes, and that such
violation justified the revocation of the plaintiff's license.
It might be well, before passing to an analysis of the decision
in the instant case, to determine in a general way, by a brief
review of the decisions, to what extent corporations are protected
by the guarantees of the Federal Constitution. It was laid down
at a relatively early date that a corporation is not a citizen within
the meaning of the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV,
Section 2, and that a corporation has no legal existence beyond
the limits of the sovereignty creating it, and cannot do business
in other states against their will., Such other states may in
general impose such conditions upon the entrance of foreign
corporations as they see fit. This power to exclude does not, of
course, extend to corporations engaged in interstate commerce, so
'Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 19 L. ed. 357 (1869).
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far as their interstate business is concerned, nor to corporations
chartered by the Federal Government for the accomplishment of
its purposes. Nor do corporations come within the protection of
the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, since that amendment was restrictively construed to limit
only state action which impaired those privileges and immunities
enjoyed by virtue of federal citizenship,2 and a corporation is not
a citizen. But a corporation is a person within the meaning of
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.3 It follows that, until a foreign corporation is
duly admitted to business in a state, it has no right to be there,
and is not a person within the jurisdictiof.1 But when it is
admitted and performs the conditions imposed upon it by state
law, it in effect has a contract with the state and, during the
period for which it is admitted, it falls within the equal protection
clause.
Since a state is conceded to possess the absolute power to
exclude foreign corporations from coming within its borders,
save for the limited exceptions mentioned, it would seem neces-
sarily to follow that there is no restriction upon the nature of the
conditions it may attach to its permission to such corporations to
enter the state. And it appeared for a time that this would be
the view of the Supreme Court upon the question.' But after
considerable vacillation, the Court has overruled its earlier utter-
ances, and has definitely established the doctrine that a state
cannot extort a waiver of constitutional rights as the price of its
license to a foreign corporation0
A state has no power to tax property or transactions beyond
its jurisdiction.7 And the power of a state to exclude foreign
corporations cannot be used to tax them upon property that
upon established principles the state has no power to tax.8 Nor
2The Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. ed. 394 (1873).
'County of San Mateo v. Southern Pac. R. R. 13 Fed. 722 (1882).
'Pembina Consol. Silver Min. & Mill Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181,
31 L. ed. 650, 8 Sup. Ct. 737 (1888).
'Security Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U. S. 246, 50 L. ed. 1013,
6 Ann. Cas. 317 (1906).
'Terral v. Burke Constr. Co. 257 U. S. 529, 66 L. ed. 352, 42 Sup. Ct. 188,
21 A. L. R. 186 (1921).
7Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905); Frick v. Pennsyl-
vania, 268 U. S. 473, 69 L. ed. 1058, 45 Sup. Ct. 603 (1925).
8Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, 54 L. cd. 355, 30 Sup. Ct. 190
(1910).
82 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNA TI LAIV REVIEW
can it use that power as a basis for regulating the conduct of such
corporations in other jurisdictions, though they actually be doing
business within the state making the attempt., But it can
prevent a corporation doing business within the state save in
the manner provided by its laws.
The language used by the lower court in the principal case
suggests the view that, since the state of Ohio might have ex-
cluded the Palmetto Co. entirely, it might also limit its right to
enter into lawful contracts of insurance without the state upon
property situated within the state, as the price of its license to
that corporation.1o To this extent its language is clearly in
conflict with the decisions cited in the preceding paragraph, and
is impliedly disapproved by Justice Holmes in his opinion.
Was the Palmetto Co., on the facts presented, actually doing
business in Ohio, or proposing to do so, so as to come within its
regulative and taxing powers? That question must be answered
in the affirmative, as Justice Holmes recognizes, if the cancella-
tion of the plaintiff's license is to be sustained. And it is sub-
mitted that that question should be given an affirmative answer.
While it is true that the contract between the Palmetto and
Chrysler Companies was a Michigan contract, still it did not of
itself purport, nor did it operate to insure anything. No car was
insured until actually sold by a dealer. The contract was merely
an agreement to issue policies to persons to whom the dealers
might sell cars. Consequently, a sale was necessary to impose
any insurer's liability whatever upon the Palmetto Co.; it was
equally essential to entitle it to a single dollar in premiums. Can
there be any doubt that the insurance is placed by the Chrysler
dealer in Ohio, as and when a sale is made there, and that the
Michigan contract operates in effect to make him the agent of
the Palmetto Co. for that purpose? If that be so, the plaintiff
was doing business in Ohio, or proposing to do so, in a manner
directly violative of the express provisions of the statutes, and its
license was properly withdrawn.
It is to be regretted that Justice Holmes did not place the
decision clearly and solely upon this basis, though it is believed it
is the ground he had in mind. His language renders the problem
unnecessarily difficult, and is confusing rather than clarifying.
ONew York, L. E. & W. R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 153 U. S. 628, 38 L. ed. 846,
14 Sup. Ct. 952 (1894); Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Tafoya, 46 Sup.
Ct. 331 (March, 1926).
109 Fed. (2d) 202, 204 (1925).
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He states that the purchaser obtained a benefit in Ohio, and that
the act was done in Ohio, and that the capacity to do it came
from the law of Ohio. What act? The mere fact that the pur-
chaser obtains a benefit as an incident to his purchase, or that he
does an act in Ohio which entitles him to such benefit is, without
more, wholely immaterial. It is not the purchaser the state of
Ohio is seeking to tax or regulate, but the Palmetto Co. Indeed,
it could not, if it wished, deprive the purchaser of the legal
capacity to do an act which would entitle him to the benefit of a
contract of insurance previously made outside the state. Such
would be an invalid interference with freedom of contract."1
Suppose the Palmetto Co. had actually insured one hundred
thousand Chrysler cars in Michigan, and -had agreed that the
Chrysler Co. might assign its rights as beneficiary to purchasers
as the cars should be sold. There also an Ohio purchaser, by his
act of buying a car in Ohio, might obtain the benefit of an in-
surance contract entered into by the Palmetto Co. in Michigan.
Yet it is not apparent upon what ground it could be held that in
such case the Palmetto Co. was transacting business in Ohio, so
as to come within its taxing or regulative jurisdiction. The cir-
cumstance that the purchaser obtains a benefit in Ohio is not the
important thing, but the fact that the transaction in the course of
which he gets such benefit constitutes a doing of business within
the state by the Palmetto Co. acting through agents not duly
authorized according to law. ARTHUR H. KENT.
SUING IN QUANTUM MERUIT FOR REAL ESTATE COMMISSION.
"No action shall be brought whereby to charge the de-
fendant-upon an agreement, promise or contract to pay any
,commission for or upon the sale of an interest in real estate;-
unless the agreement upon which such action is brought or
some memorandum or note thereof is in writing and signed
by the party to be charged therewith or some other person
thereunto by him or her lawfully authorized.''
The italicized words will be recognized by Ohio lawyers, as the
amendment to the Statute of Frauds passed by the General
Assembly of the State of Ohio in 1925.
Does this amendment operate to prevent a recovery for
services rendered by a real estate broker unless in every case he
"Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 832, 17 Sup. Ct. 127 (1897).
'Gen. Code of Ohio, Section 8621, as amended to take effect. Jtuly 10, 1925.
